SECCS: SECure Context Saving for IoT Devices by Valea, Emanuele et al.
SECCS: SECure Context Saving for IoT Devices 
 
Emanuele Valea, Mathieu Da Silva, Giorgio Di Natale, Marie-Lise Flottes, Sophie Dupuis, Bruno Rouzeyre 
LIRMM (Université Montpellier/CNRS), Montpellier, France 
{valea,mdasilva,dinatale,flottes,dupuis,rouzeyre}@lirmm.fr 
 
 
 
Abstract—Energy consumption of IoT devices is a very 
important issue. For this reason, many techniques have been 
developed to allow IoT nodes to be aware of the amount of 
available energy. When energy is missing, the device halts and 
saves its state. One of those techniques is context saving, 
relying on the use of Non-Volatile Memories (NVM) to store 
and restore the state of the device. However, this information, 
as far as IoT devices deal with security, might be the target of 
attacks, including tampering and theft of confidential data. In 
this paper, we propose a SECure Context Saving (SECCS) 
approach that provides a context saving procedure and a 
hardware module easy to implement inside a System on Chip 
(SoC). This approach provides both confidentiality and 
integrity to all the CPU content saved into the target NVM. 
Keywords—IoT, Security, Hardware Security, Context 
Saving 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has known an extraordinary 
fast dissemination in the last years, leading to an always-
increasing number of devices connected to a network. 
Nonetheless, the access to the energy source can be difficult, 
according to the kind of infrastructure. Consequently, 
techniques have been developed, such as energy harvesting, 
which makes the device self-powered without needing any 
wired or battery-based power source. For this reason, these 
devices need to be designed in order to be robust against 
intermittent power supply. A common practice, called 
Context Saving, consists in saving the state of the device into 
a Non Volatile Memory (NVM) when the power supply 
cannot be guaranteed. The running process is resumed as 
soon as the energy is available by restoring the state from the 
NVM [1]. 
More and more often, we witness the commercialization 
of IoT devices dealing with confidential and private data [2]. 
This establishes a need for security in many emerging IoT 
applications. We believe that this goes into contrast with the 
existing context saving techniques, which expose the content 
of the internal registers of the CPU to an external NVM 
without implementing security criteria. In fact, the 
interruption of the power supply can be maliciously triggered 
by an attacker in order to force the CPU to expose its content 
in convenient moments of the computation. In addition, 
NVMs can be observed and even tampered (possibly 
performing fault attacks) by any attacker that has physical 
access to the device, according to the implemented 
technology and the kind of NVM that is employed [3]. 
We propose a SECure Context Saving (SECCS), based 
on a hardware module, which provides both confidentiality 
and integrity to all the CPU content that is saved into the 
target NVM. The module can be plugged into any SoC 
design and can be activated whenever the user wants the 
system to perform a secure context saving in the case of 
supply unavailability. Confidentiality is provided via 
encryption, while the integrity against memory tampering is 
provided via a Message Authentication Code (MAC) derived 
from the saved context. 
II. SECURE CONTEXT SAVING 
The SECCS module is interposed between the processor 
and the target NVM (Fig. 1). The processor monitors the 
supply voltage and, when needed, activates the context 
saving procedure. A Context Storing Phase (CSP) is 
activated when the supply power is going to run out and the 
context of the computation is moved out from the processor. 
The context data are encrypted using a stream cipher, and a 
MAC signature is also generated. The encrypted data and the 
signature are then stored into the target NVM and the system 
is turned off. The Context Loading Phase (CLP) is activated 
when the power supply is available again and the 
computation of the processor is restored by loading back the 
context of the processor. The context content is decrypted 
and the MAC signature is checked in order to verify the 
integrity of the recovered data. If the integrity check fails, 
that means that a tampering attempt has been performed on 
the NVM. 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of the SECCS module. 
The key generator (Fig. 2) produces two different secret 
keys during the CSP, one for the stream cipher and one for 
the MAC engine. The key generation process must be 
unpredictable in order to prevent the attacker from 
overcoming the encryption and integrity features. For this 
reason, a PUF-based architecture has been conceived. At 
first, a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) generates a 
random value. This value, stored into a dedicated NVM, is 
used as a challenge for the PUF to produce a response. The 
response obtained by the PUF is used as a secret key. During 
the CLP, the challenges, read from the NVM, are sent to the 
PUF in order to regenerate the same keys produced during 
the CSP. Even if the attacker reads the dedicated NVM of 
the key generator, he/she has only knowledge of the session 
challenges. Due to the unpredictability of the response given 
by the PUF, he/she is not able to rebuild the keys. 
 
Fig. 2. Architecture of the key generator. 
The stream cipher performs encryption of context data 
coming from the processor during the CSP, and decryption 
of data coming from the target NVM during CLP. The 
stream cipher performs an XOR operation between the input 
data and the keystream generated by a Pseudo Random 
Generator (PRG). The PRG takes as input an initialization 
value, called seed, which is the secret key of the stream 
cipher. The key generator provides a different key each time 
a new encryption session starts. The context of the processor 
is encrypted and stored into the NVM. When the system is 
powered off, no secrets are revealed to an attacker trying to 
read out the content. During the CLP, context data are 
recovered from the target NVM after decryption and 
reintroduced inside the processor. The stream cipher is used 
with the same secret key used during the CSP. 
The MAC engine is used to provide a signature of the 
context data. During the CSP, the signature is computed and 
stored into the target NVM together with the encrypted 
context data. During the CLP, the signature is read from the 
target NVM and compared with the signature computed 
from the decrypted context data. The MAC module verify if 
the two signatures are equal to ensure the integrity of the 
context data. The MAC module uses a secret key in order to 
compute the hash function of the data. With the same 
principle as the stream cipher key, the key generator 
generates a new key during the CSP and reuses the same 
during the CLP. 
Table I reports the cost of an implementation that uses 
SHA-256 engine as MAC module, the Trivium stream 
cipher, a TRNG from the Synopsys DesignWare IP library 
and an Arbiter PUF. 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  AREA COST OF SECCS MODULE 
Submodule Area (gate equivalent) 
TRNG 15000 
PUF 516 
MAC 10763 
Stream cipher 2016 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a solution for IoT devices using a 
microprocessor and requiring security. We consider a 
system exploiting context saving in external non-volatile 
memories (NVM), activated when the available energy is 
not enough to continue the execution of the processes. We 
want to prevent attacks on the saved state of the device, 
including tampering and fault attacks. We proposed a 
SECure Context Saving (SECCS) providing a hardware 
module easy to implement inside a System on Chip (SoC). 
This solution ensures both confidentiality and integrity to all 
the CPU content saved into the target NVM due to the 
context saving procedure. The proposed solution can have a 
large impact on the area overhead of the system. However, 
the need for security cannot be ignored in many 
applications. For this reason, we believe that scarifying a 
part of the power budget can be necessary for higher 
security.  
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